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Persistent and widespread poverty in less favored areas (LFAs) is attributed to fragile natural resources and poor 
markets. Limited assets may keep households outside the reach of poverty policies targeted at LFAs. We explore in a 
stylized manner the role of heterogeneous household assets for (1) policies aimed at poverty reduction; (2) within-
village income inequality; (3) soil erosion. With a farm-household micro-simulation model we analyze for each 
household in a remote Ethiopian village three sets of policies: technology improvement, infrastructure investment, 
and off-farm employment through migration or cash for work (CFW) programs. Combating poverty with a single 
policy, migration reduces the poverty headcount most. Because of self-selection, CFW programs performed best in 
terms of reaching the poorest of the poor. CFW also reduce within-village income inequality most, while a price band 
reduction increases income inequality. Only technology improvements imply a trade-off between poverty and soil 
erosion. Price band and off-farm employment reduce erosion while outperforming technology improvements in terms 
of poverty reduction. Combining two policies helps poorer households to overcome the limitations of their asset 
endowments. Combining a cash for work program with a reduction in price bands yields most in terms of poverty 
reduction and income inequality. This policy complementarity is less important for better endowed households. 
Reducing the reliance of households on agriculture offers a win-win situation of reducing poverty and maintaining 
natural resources. Combining policies helps to overcome asset limitations, to target policies to the poorest households 
and to reduce income inequalities. 
 
Key words: less-favored areas; farm households; poverty;  erosion; micro-simulation; Ethiopia 
JEL codes: C6 (mathematical programming); Q12 (micro analysis of farm households); Q56 
(environment and development) 
 
 
                                                      
# Financial support from the Regional Food Security Policies for Natural Resource Management and Sustainable 
Economies (RESPONSE), a joint programme of  Wageningen Univeristy and Research Centre (WUR) and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), is gratefully acknowledged. We owe thanks to IFPRI for 
making the data used in this analysis available. 
  1Rural households living is less-favoured areas (LFAs) represent globally around a third of the chronic 
poor that are difficult to reach with standard programs for poverty alleviation (Ruben and Pender 2004; 
Hazell et al. 2005). Persistent poverty in less-favoured areas is usually attributed to a fragile natural 
resource base (compared to population density) and poor market linkages. Whereas spatial targeting can 
be effective for reducing absolute poverty due to adverse geographical conditions (Ravallion and Jalan, 
1996), a large part of the variation in household income can be attributed to within-village differences in 
initial resource endowments (Jayne et al., 2003; Elbers et al., 2004).  
  Most of the poverty prevailing in LFAs has been characterised as ‘asset poverty’, where rural 
households possess limited resources (land, labour or cattle) to cope with adverse events and are 
extremely vulnerable to shocks that could lead to an irreversible breakdown of their asset base (Carter and 
Barrett 2005). Under these conditions, farmers typically engage in low-return activities and try to 
diversify their activity portfolio in order to be able to deal with unexpected income shortfalls 
(Zimmerman and Carter 2003). Overcoming such poverty traps is only possible when minimum asset 
thresholds can be reached (Lybbert et al. 2004). By affecting activity choices, heterogeneous asset 
endowments are likely to reinforce income inequality and could easily lead to biased policies where the 
better-off household capture the lion’s share of the benefits (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; 
Lipton, 2005).  
Strategies for poverty alleviation in LFAs should consider interactions between distribution and 
growth. Cross-country evidence shows that inequality of income and unequal distribution of assets lead to 
reduced growth rates (Deininger and Squire 1998; Birdsall and Londoño 1998; Keefer and Knack 2002). 
Within LFAs, it is likely that similar mechanisms are in force. Policies aiming at reducing both poverty 
levels and income equality may thus contribute most to sustained economic development in LFAs. 
Targeting poor households requires insight in minimum asset thresholds and complementarities 
among assets and policies. Income distribution is also a matter of concern, with a view on future 
development. Furthermore, poverty in LFAs is often attributed to a fragile natural resource base, which 
may limit the scope for reducing poverty by intensifying agricultural production. Our objective is to 
explore in a stylized manner the role of heterogeneous household endowments for (1) policies aimed at 
poverty reduction; (2) within-village income inequality; (3) resource degradation. Using a micro-
  2simulation model we analyze for each household in a remote Ethiopian village three sets of policies 
commonly put forward to reduce poverty: technology improvement, infrastructure investment, and off-
farm employment through migration or local government programs. 
  We start by presenting the micro-simulation model and data of the numerical implementation. We 
then analyze the impact of single policies on poverty, income distribution and erosion, followed by an 
analysis of the role of households assets in the poverty impacts of policies. We proceed by analyzing the 
impact of combined policies. The last section concludes. 
 
A stylized micro-simulation farm household model  
To analyze the impact of heterogeneous resource endowments and income distribution we employ a 
micro-simulation model. We formulate a standard farm household model in the tradition of Sing, Squire 
and Strauss (1986). Households maximize utility, 
  ,  ∀ h,  j∈C (1)  ∑ =
j
hj j h QC U ln µ
where Uh is household utility, µj is the budget share of good j, QChj
 is the quantity consumed of good j 
and J is the set of all commodities in the model of which C is a subset of consumed commodities. We use 
a Cobb-Douglas utility function for reasons of tractability. 
Utility maximization is first of all constraint by the available production technologies, described 
by Leontief technologies that make full use of technical data available for the case study area. For each 
activity (a) we define input use and output supplied in relation to an activity level (QAh,a,tech):  
    ∀ h,  j∈I (2a)  ∑∑ =
a tech
tech a h tech j a j h QA QI , , , , , α
    ∀ h,  j∈O (2b)  ∑∑ =
a tech
tech a h tech j a j h QA QO , , , , , β
In case of crop activities QAh,a,tech refers to the cultivated area, in case of livestock activities to the number 
of animals. Activities can be performed with different technologies (tech). For  crop activities technology 
consists of a combination of soil types, technology (choices regarding use of fertilizer and type of 
traction) and levels of intensity. In case of livestock activities there is only a choice in energy intake. The 
  3input (αa,j,tech) and output (βa,j,tech) coefficients determine input demanded (QIh,j) and output supplied 
(QOh,j) of each activity. 
Next to crop output, each crop technology has a level of erosion associated with it. We compute 
the total amount of erosion at village level (E),  
∑∑∑ =
h a tech
tech a h tech j a QA E , , , , ε  
to asses the impact of household production decisions on soil erosion. 
Household utility maximization is further constrained by commodity balances. The extent to 
which these affect household decision-making depends on the level of tradability. Goods that are 
household nontradable (HNT) cannot be bought or sold. Household demand thus needs to satisfy 
household supply, 
   ,  ∀ h, j∈HNT (3)  j h j h
off
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where in addition to the variables defined before, QCh,j is household consumption, Qoffh,j are inputs 
(labor) used in off-farm employment and cash for work programs (off is the set of off-farm activities); ωh,j 
are household endowments.  
  In case of goods that can be bought or sold, two different types of commodities are distinguished. 
There are goods that are only traded locally, for which there are no transaction costs driving a wedge 
between buying and selling prices. These are household tradables and village nontradables (VNT). There 
are also goods that are traded outside of the village for which the households do incur transaction costs. 
Buying prices of these village tradables (VT) then exceed selling prices. Since these goods can be both 
bought and sold by the household not the commodity balance, but the cash constraint restricts utility 
maximization, 
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where p,j is the is the price of village nontradables; QMSh,j is the marketed surplus of village nontradables; 
for village tradables we have psh,j is the price received when selling, QSh,j,vt the amount sold of a village 
tradable; pph,j the price paid when buying and QPh,j,vt is the amount purchased. Households can earn 
income by engaging in off-farm activities (Yh,off), which can either be off-farm employment or cash for 
work programs. There is an upper bound on the availability of off-farm employment (offavh,j,off). We thus 
assume segmented labor markets which limit the access of households to off-farm employment. 
The stylized household model limits the variation across households to variation in household 
resource endowments. All households are thus assumed to have access to the same technologies and 
holding identical preferences (as can be seen from the absence of a household index in the production and 
utility functions). Restricting heterogeneity to household endowments implies that our assessment of the 
impact of household heterogeneity on policy impacts can be taken as a lower bound estimate. We 
furthermore use a static household model in which households are not saving or investing in new assets
1. 
Despite the static nature of the model we can explore the impact of asset thresholds by relying on the 
variation in endowments across households. It allows us to explore whether (combinations) of policies 
can overcome the restrictions of limited assets. Finally, we do include the possibility of locally traded 
goods, renting of land and animal traction within a village. We do however not account for local markets. 
We faced a trade-off between the use of technical data to model production and its impact on soil erosion 
versus well-behaved functional forms needed to arrive at a local market equilibrium. Given the 
importance of fragile natural resources in LFAs we gave precedence to analyzing the impact of 
agricultural activities on soil erosion, forcing us to ignore interactions among households in local markets. 
 
A village in the Northern Highlands of Ethiopia 
To study the impact of heterogeneous household endowments we rely on census data covering the 
endowments of all 200 households in an Ethiopian village. The village is located in the Eastern part of 
Tigray, a poor region in Ethiopia with limited agricultural potential due to poor soils and erratic rainfall. 
                                                      
1 Introducing saving behavior in a static model amounts to including a fixed saving propensity. This would reduce 
the available income for consumption but would not qualitatively alter the results of the model. 
  5The village has an average rainfall of 450 mm and lacks irrigation structures, limiting agricultural 
opportunities. Fertile land is limited to a small valley bottom set amidst steep slopes and high plateaux. 
Erosion (including gully erosion) is a severe problem in the village as a result of the steep slopes and loss 
of vegetative cover. In addition to limited natural endowments, the village has no roads to the nearest 
town. As a result of these unfavorable conditions many households in the village cannot satisfy their own 
food requirements (Meijerink 2002). 
  To implement the model numerically we need data on consumption and technologies. We use 
secondary data from Ethiopia on household expenditure patterns for rural households in the lowest 5 
quintiles (Diao, Gautam et al. 2004) to compute budget shares (µj). This resulted in the following 
expenditure pattern by category: cereals 0.42, non-cereals 0.21; purchased food 0.15, milk and meat 0.05 
and leisure 0.18. We use technical data of production systems in Tigray to derive input and output 
coefficients, including the effect of production on soil erosion (Hengsdijk 2003). In the stylized farm 
household models each household can choose from five crops (barley, millet, sorghum, wheat and pulses) 
and three types of livestock (cows, sheep and goats) each producing two types of output (milk and meat). 
For each activity households can choose between different technologies, as explained in the mathematical 
exposition of the model. 
Although endowments play a central role they do not completely bind households. Household 
endowments of land and oxen can be rented in or out (against fixed prices, in the absence of a village 
market in the model). Household labor and livestock endowments (goats, sheep and cows) are assumed to 
be nontradable. Livestock products can be sold locally without a price-band between buying and selling 
prices. Crop outputs are sold and purchased outside the village with a price-band representing transaction 
costs of buying or selling. There is no local market for crop output since all households are facing the 
same periodicity in crop production. Finally, there is a cash for work program in place providing a base 
income to all households in the village. 
To analyze poverty we need to define a poverty line. Given the stylized nature of the model we 
use a relative poverty line from a rapid diagnostic appraisal. According to a wealth ranking by villagers, 
74 percent of the households is considered poor (Meijerink 2002). We use income per adult equivalent (to 
account for differences in household size and composition) from the base run to determine a poverty line 
  6such that 74 percent of the households is considered very poor. This results in a poverty line of 760 birr 
per capita per year, translating to 2.04 dollar per day
2. The household classification by villagers thus 
appears to correspond rather well with the international poverty line of 2 dollar per day. If we would use 
the a one dollar per day poverty line, 45 percent of the households would be classified as poor.  
 
Analyzing the poverty impact of single policies 
We start by analyzing the poverty impact of three sets of policies often suggested to reduce poverty in 
less-favored areas: 
1)  Technology: improving technologies by raising production from 70 to 100 percent of the maximum 
attainable production level: (1a) Fertilizer: raise only productivity of technologies using fertilizer; 
(1b) Non-fertilizer: raise only productivity of technologies not using fertilizer; (1c) All technologies: 
raise productivity of all technologies.  
2)  Prices: infrastructure investments are assumed to reduce the price-band (i.e. the difference between 
buying and selling outside the village) by 50 percent: (2a) Inputs: reduce only price-band of 
agricultural inputs (fertilizer); (2b) Consumption goods: reduce only price-band of consumption 
goods; (2c) All goods: reduce price-band of all goods. 
3)  Off-farm: increased off-farm employment through: (3a) Migration: allow households with an adult 
male to have up to one migrant; (3b) Cash for Work (CFW): double the availability of local 
employment through the cash for work program from 30 to 60 days per household 
These policy shocks applied to the model are extreme, designed to explore the potential impact on 
different households. In the migration scenario, for example, we allow any household with an adult male 
to migrate
3. In practice there will be barriers in terms of (social) capital that will limit the access to 
migration for poor households. We furthermore run a number of sub-scenarios, like only reducing the 
price-band for inputs, in order to decompose the impact of different policy-components. 
                                                      
2 We use a purchasing parity exchange rate of 1.02 birr per dollar derived from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
3 We lack data on the education levels of household members. Analyzing available data on whether children are 
send to school (assuming that this could serve as a proxy of the education of the parents) we found all households 
with an adult male to send their children to school. We therefore assumed that all households with an adult male 
could engage in migration if the opportunity would present itself. 
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Poverty impact of single policies 
Analyzing the impact of single policies (upper part of table 1) we find that promoting fertilizers (through 
technology improvement or by lowering its price) stretches far beyond the households initially using 
fertilizer. But not all households benefit from fertilizer policies due to the cash constraint households face. 
In contrast, improvement of non-fertilizer technologies reaches all households in the village
4. The impact 
of promoting migration is limited to households with an adult male that can migrate (40 percent of the 
households). Despite this limited reach, migration reduces the poverty headcount most. This is due to the 
assumption that all households with an adult male can participate in migration. No additional investments 
are needed that may in practice limit the access of poor households to migration.  In terms of reaching the 
poorest of the poor, the CFW program outperforms all other policies, reducing the poverty gap 7 percent 
points and the severity of poverty by 6 percent points.  
 
Single policies and income inequality 
In the base run we find a Gini coefficient of 0.40. The CFW program performs best in terms of reducing 
income inequality, reducing the Gini to 0.36. This is not surprising since the poverty indicators showed 
that the CFW program targets the poorest of the poor. This is reflected in the income increases from the 
CFW program, which are 49 percent for the lowest income quintile and only 6 percent for the highest 
income quintile. This finding underscores the importance of the CFW programs for sustaining the living 
of the poorest households in the village. 
  A different pattern appears with a reduction in the price band of consumption goods. Compared to 
the other policies it performs rather well in terms of the poverty indicators, since the poor are net buyers 
of food. It does however also increase the Gini coefficient to 0.41. Richer households have more money 
to spend on consumption goods and thus benefit more from the price reduction. 
 
Single policies and soil erosion 
                                                      
4 This is due to the presence of a land rental market. In the absence of a land market the landless households (8 
percent of the village) would not benefit from improved crop technologies. 
  8A key question when combating poverty in LFAs is a possible trade-off combating poverty and 
maintaining fragile natural resources. In the case study village we focus on erosion, a key natural resource 
issue in the village. All policies except for the improved non-fertilizer technologies result in a decrease in 
erosion (last column in table 1). Non-fertilizer technologies have higher erosion levels and improved 
technologies result in more intensive land use. Improved fertilizer technologies reduce soil erosion 
because more households start using fertilizes. In terms of poverty impacts improved non-fertilizer 
technologies outperformed fertilizer technologies. Focusing only on technology improvements there thus 
seems to be a trade-off between combating poverty and maintaining the resource base. 
The other policies all reduce erosion levels while having  a stronger impact on poverty than 
technology improvement. These policies affect erosion through two pathways: access to fertilizer and less 
need to derive cash income from agriculture. Access to fertilizer is improved through a reduced fertilizer 
price (price band policy) or by cash income from migration or CFW. Improved access to fertilizer 
increases the number of households using less-erosive fertilizer technologies. A reduction in the price of 
consumption goods or alternative non-farm income (migration or CFW) reduces the pressure on 
households to derive (cash) income from agriculture. Reducing the intensity of agriculture also reduces 
soil erosion. Price band and especially off-farm policies thus offer more scope for both erosion and 
poverty reduction than improved (non-fertilizer) technologies. 
 
Asset poverty and its implications for policy impacts 
So far we focused on poverty defined in terms of household income. As discussed in the introduction, 
assets play a central role in poverty (Carter and Barrett 2005; Zimmerman and Carter 2003). With our 
static model we cannot examine changes in assets and poverty over time. We can however examine the 
relation between assets and income across households, which provides a cross-sectional look at the level 
of assets needed to move above the poverty line. Figure 1 presents the income per adult equivalent in 
combination with the asset endowments by income quintile. 
  The most striking result is that the lowest two income quintiles do not own any oxen. Comparing 
this with the distribution of income across households in the top part of figure 1 we find that lack of oxen 
is associated with household income being below 1 dollar a day. The importance of oxen ownership is 
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also apparent at the top part of the income distribution. Households in the top income quintile (which 
about corresponds to the households above the 2 dollar a day poverty line) own oxen. Oxen and other 
livestock are the only assets that show a consistent increase moving from the lowest to the highest income 
quintile. Land and labor endowments do not show a clear pattern, which may be a result of land reforms 
that occurred in the recent past. Oxen ownership does not provide a clear threshold separating the poor 
from the nonpoor. In between the two poverty lines we find about 30 percent of the village households. 
Halve of these households have oxen but limited land, and the other halve have land but lack oxen. Land 
endowments are thus complementary to oxen ownership and may even compensate for a lack of oxen. 
Figure 1 suggests the presence of an asset threshold around the 2 dollar a day poverty line. 
Incomes of households above this poverty line show a much stronger increase when moving to the richer 
households than it decreases when moving to the poorer households. This suggests a minimum amount of 
assets for households to engage in productive activities. The relative flatness of the income line just below 
the 2 dollar a day poverty line implies that the reductions in the poverty headcounts in table 1 present a 
flattered picture. Improved technologies, for example, lead to minor income changes. Because of the 
shape of the income distribution this still results in a 2 to 4 percent reduction of the poverty headcount. 
 
Analyzing the poverty impact of combined policies 
With single policies we find heterogeneous assets affecting the impact of policies. Combined policies 
could be more effective if complementarities between policies overcome asset limitations. We thus run 
combinations of the policies analyzed above. To limit the number of possible combinations we combine a 
change in all technologies (1c), in prices of al goods (2c) with the two off-farm income scenarios leaving 
us five different scenarios.Table 1: Poverty, income, income inequality  and erosion with different policy scenarios 
         Reach
a) Poverty
b) Income  inequality Erosion
c)
              (%) P0    P1 P2 Gini  (%  change)
Base run  n.a.        74  40 26 0.40 n.a.
        
     
     
Single policies   
1) Technology   
a fertilizer  66  72  39 26  0.40  -14 
b non-fertilizer  100  68  37 24  0.39  3 
c all techologies  100  68 
 
37 24  0.39 
 
3 
2) Price band     
   
        
     
a inputs  68  71  39 26  0.40  -17 
b consumption goods  100  66  35 22  0.41  -1 
c all goods  100  66 
 




a migration  40  64  34 22  0.39  -28 
b CFW  100  70  33 20  0.36  -18 
Combined policies   
Technology (1c) & prices (2c)  100  64  32 20  0.40  1 
Technology (1c) & migration (3a)  100  63  31 20  0.38  -27 
Technology (1c) & CFW (3b)  100  65  30 17  0.35  -14 
Prices (2c) & migration (3a)  100  56  29 19  0.41  -41 
Prices (2c) &  CFW (3b)  100  57  27 16  0.37  -34 
a) Percentage of households affected by the policy; 
b) Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures, P0 is the poverty headcount, P1 the poverty gap and P2 the severity of 
poverty;  
c) Change in erosion is computed in percentage with respect to erosion levels in the base run.  
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  Q1          Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  
Income ($ per day)  0.4  0.7  1.2  1.9  3.4   
            
           
           
Land  (ha)  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2   
 - bad quality (% of total land)  63.7  55.2  40.6  45.7  40.2   
-  medium quality (% of total land)  19.4  35.0  34.6  40.9  28.1   
- good quality (% of total land) 
 
14.4  7.3  12.3  13.4  9.2   
Land/labor ratio (ha/adult equivalent)  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2   
Labor (adult equivalent) 
 
2.4  1.8  2.2  2.7  1.7   
Number of oxen   0.0  0.0  0.3  0.9  1.1   
Other livestock (TLU)  0.2  0.9  1.8  2.6  2.8   
Figure 1: Income distribution and resource endowments by quintile 
 Poverty impact of combined policies 
Comparing poverty indicators of single and combined policies there appear to be complementarities 
between the policies in terms of combating poverty. Any combination of two policies outperforms all 
single policies for all three poverty measures. Although no policy combination strictly dominates all 
other combinations in terms of poverty reduction, the combination of a price band reduction with the 
CFW program performs best in terms of reaching the poorest of the poor and is almost at equal stance 
with the prices and migration combination in terms of reducing the poverty headcount.   
 

































































































Note: table entries are the income increase (in %) from combined policies minus the sum of the income increase 
(in %) of separate policies. 
 
 
Combined policies and income inequality 
To analyze the presence of interaction effects of policies we examine combinations of policies. There 
are three possible outcomes: competing policies (income of combined policies is less than the sum of 
  13separate policies), no interaction (income of combined policies is equal to the sum of separate 
policies) and complementary policies (income of combined policies exceeds to the sum of separate 
policies). We present the results by income quintile, which because of the close link between income 
and assets found above, indicates whether combined policies help overcome the asset restrictions of 
poor households (figure 2). 
  The most striking finding in figure 2 is that for the poorest income quintile all policy 
combinations are complementary. Moreover, the effect is consistently stronger for the poorest income 
quintile than for any of the other quintiles. This strong positive impact of combined policies on the 
poorest households drives the reductions in Gini coefficients found for combined policies. 
Complementarity of policies can thus help in overcoming limited assets. This is more important for 
asset-poor households and thus aids in targeting policies at the poorest households. 
 
Combined policies and soil erosion 
In terms of soil erosion only the combination of price band and technology policies yields unexpected 
results. Given the reduction percentages with the single policies one may expect the price band effect 
(-17 percent) to dominate the technology effect (+3 percent). Their combined effect however is a one 
percent increase in erosion. The improved non-fertilizer technologies reduce the shift to using fertilizer 
when its price is reduced. More important however is the combination of policies which changes the 
choice of fertilizer technologies. With improved technology and a reduced fertilizer price households 
opt for a fertilizer technology without the use of oxen (prices of oxen are fixed). Technologies without 
oxen are more erosive than those with oxen and thus the amount of erosion increases.  Changing 
technologies as well as relative prices of inputs thus affects technology choice in such a way  that the 




We explored the implications of heterogeneous household asset endowments for policies aimed at 
reducing poverty in LFAs. Analyzing the poverty impact, we found that combining policies helps 
  14poorer households to overcome the limitations of their asset endowments. This complementarity of 
policies is less important for better endowed households. As a result, combining complementary 
policies helps in targeting the poorest households, thus reducing income inequalities. 
  The importance of assets has implications for the distributive consequences of policies. We 
found a reduction in price bands to reduce poverty while at the same time increasing income 
inequality. Many households thus benefit, but richer households benefit disproportionally. The 
opposite holds for the CFW program which, through self-selection, targets the poorest household. 
Combining the CFW program with a price band reduction was found to benefit the poorest households 
most while still reducing income inequality in the village. This combination of policies was also found 
to result in the strongest reduction in erosion, thus providing a win-win option for combating poverty 
and reducing natural resource degradation in the village. 
  The simple stylized micro-simulation model we employed in this paper is insightful because 
of its tractability. The simple nature of the model and the rather extreme scenarios the analysis cannot 
be relied upon for direct policy advice. The model does not account for limited access to new 
technologies or migration that are likely to exist for the poorest households. These scenarios therefore 
overestimate the impact of technology or migration on poverty reduction as well as the associated 
reductions in income inequality. The model also lacks risk, which Zimmerman and Carter (2003) 
found to be an important impediment for poor households to engage in more profitable activities. The 
absence of risk in our model implies that we overestimate the poverty impacts of single policies. In 
terms of combined policies we may be underestimating the poverty impact. Combining an improved 
technology with a CFW program may put the technologies within the reach of the poor households, 
not only by providing the cash needed for inputs (we find increased adoption of improved 
technologies employing oxen), but also by allowing the households to take more risk by providing a 
minimum income. With our static model we are unable to analyze the dynamics of asset accumulation. 
By analyzing individual households, however, we have a cross-sectional perspective on the role of 
assets. Given the lack of availability of panel data for most developing countries, such a cross-
sectional analysis of the role of assets provides an important first look a the role of assets for poverty 
reduction policies. 
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